The High Court has scrutinised the validity of a Declaration of Trust and the enforcement of charging orders. Wade v Singh sheds light on the intricate balance between property rights, trust law, and creditor protection in an insolvency. The case, centered around a property known as "the Oaks," involved the liquidators of MSD Cash & Carry Plc (in liquidation) seeking to enforce charging orders against properties owned by various family members involved in the business to satisfy a significant judgment debt.

Background of the Case

The High Court has confirmed in the recent case of Hyde and another v Djurberg and others ([2024] EWHC 1188 (Ch)) that it won't tolerate the concealment of after-acquired property from trustees in bankruptcy, even when the property is the subject of a settlement agreement and paid onto various third parties. The judgment highlights the importance of monitoring a bankrupt's affairs as a trustee, acting quickly to preserve assets and serving a notice pursuant to section 307 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (Act) if there's a potential claim for after-acquired property.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

When finances become distressed, creditors examine all avenues to recover their debt which can result in any intercreditor agreements being thrown into the spotlight. The recent judgment of Re Arboretum Devon is another helpful reminder to lenders entering into an intercreditor agreement (ICA) that these should be drafted with the worst-case scenario in mind and using the clearest language in order to avoid disputes arising at the time of enforcement.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by

State governments can be creditors of individuals, businesses and institutions that are debtors in bankruptcy in a variety of ways, most notably as tax and fine collectors but also as lenders. They can also be debtors of debtors, in their role, for example, as the purchasers of vast quantities of goods and services on credit. And they can also be transferees of a debtor’s property in (at least) every role in which they can be creditors.