Introduction

On 9 May 2024, the Oireachtas enacted the Employment (Collective Redundancies and Miscellaneous Provisions) and Companies (Amendment) Act 2024 (“the Act”). Part 4 of this Act amends certain provisions of the 2014 Companies Act.

Notification Obligations

The Act inserts new subsections under sections 571, 573, and 594 of the Act of 2014 for the notification of relevant parties. This means that:

On 30 November the Supreme Court delivered its written judgment dealing with the correct test for insolvency when considering the eligibility of a debtor for a Personal Insolvency Arrangement (PIA) under the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 (as amended).

Background

One of the qualifying criteria for a PIA is that the debtor must demonstrate that the debtor is “insolvent” within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Personal Insolvency Act 2012. That provision defines the term as meaning “that the debtor is unable to pay his or her debts in full as they fall due”.

While the economy continues to look positive on paper, the underlying issues stemming from recent inflation and ever increasing overheads continue to affect businesses. Against this backdrop and a year on from the commencement of the European Union (Preventive Restructuring) Regulations 2022 (SI 380/2022) (“the 2022 Regulations”) on 29 July 2022, it seems auspicious to remind directors of their duties to wind up a company in a timely manner or simply exercise good corporate governance and wind up companies that are no longer operational.

The High Court has delivered its written judgment on a recent decision that was the first of its kind by appointing an examiner to a company registered outside of the State, as it was established that its centre of main interests was in the Republic of Ireland.

Changes have been introduced to the current Irish examinership regime with effect from 29 July 2022 when the European Union (Preventive Restructuring) Regulations 2022 (the “Regulations”) transposed into Irish Law certain mandatory articles of the European Union Preventive Restructuring Directive (EU Directive 2019/1023) (the “Directive”) that relate to corporate insolvency.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment has published the General Scheme of the Companies (Small Company Administrative Rescue Process and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2021. The General Scheme of the Bill amends the Companies Act 2014 to provide for a rescue process specifically designed for small and micro enterprises known as the Small Company Administrative Rescue Process (“SCARP”). Up to 98% of companies fall within the definition of small and micro enterprises and thus have the option to avail of the process where the eligibility criteria are met.

Yesterday, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment announced that the Government has approved the extension until 31 December 2021 of the period during which the interim measures introduced under the Companies (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Covid-19) Act 2020 (the 2020 Act) (link to announcement here) will apply.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background