The Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. These avoidance powers are subject to certain limitations, including a safe harbor in section 546(e) exempting certain transfers. Among other things, section 546(e) bars avoidance of a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . .

Last February, we blogged about the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp, No. 19-1430, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4947 (Feb. 18, 2020). The Third Circuit approved a process for resolving asbestos claims in which a bar date was imposed on filing the claims, but late claimants who were unaware of their asbestos claims would be allowed to have the bar date excused through Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3). (A bar date is a date set by the court by which all claims against the debtor must be filed.

In a case of first impression on the issue of “whether a lease assumption can survive discharge even though it is not reaffirmed[,]” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a creditor’s post-discharge attempt to collect the balance owed under an automobile lease assumed by the debtor post-petition but prior to discharge in a Chapter 7 case did not violate the discharge injunction.

Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, when a transfer is avoided under one of several other sections of the Code, a trustee may recover “the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property” from “the initial transferee of such transfer,” “the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made,” or “any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.” 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently reversed a bankruptcy court’s disallowance of postpetition interest at the default contract rate, holding that “the bankruptcy court erred in applying a liquidated damages analysis and ruling the default interest rate was an unenforceable penalty,” and also erred in weighing “equitable considerations” to avoid enforcing the contractual default interest rate.

Courts reviewing a bankruptcy court’s decision to approve a chapter 11 reorganization plan over the objections of an interested party must consider not only the merits, but also (if implementation of the plan was not stayed) potential injury to the reliance interests of other parties relying on the plan. These issues are confronted in Drivetrain, LLC v. Kozel (In re Abengoa Bioenergy Biomass of Kansas), 2020 WL 2121449 (10th Cir.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s holding that the contemporaneous exchange for new value defense to a preference action under § 547(c) applied to a creditor bank that released its liens for less than full payment.

In so ruling, the Eighth Circuit BAP held that the bankruptcy trustee could not recover two of the three payments that the debtor made to the bank during the 90-day pre-petition preference period.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently rejected a loan servicer’s appeal from a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s ruling to remand to the lower bankruptcy court a punitive damages award for alleged discharge violations.

In so ruling, the Court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction regarding the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s ruling as to the punitive damages award, but affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s denial of the debtors’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees.

When there are large numbers of substantial individual tort claims against a debtor, potentially involving claimants unknowable to the debtor who themselves may not know they have a claim, the bankruptcy process faces special problems. One objective of bankruptcy is to afford final relief to the debtor from the debtor’s debts, but discharging the claims of those unknown claimants without notice and a hearing poses due process problems.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of a consumer’s Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the claim was barred by the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the federal Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).

A copy of the opinion in Shaw v. Bank of America is available at: Link to Opinion.