Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

We have blogged previously about the intersection of fraud and bankruptcy.

Publicly, Diamond Finance Co. (“Diamond”) provided car loans to individuals with less-than-stellar credit. While Diamond did have “some actual business,” its purpose “quickly became a front to lure unsuspecting investors.”

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

Judge Jacqueline P. Cox recently found that three Illinois attorneys violated their ethical obligations by failing to return their client’s phone calls. She thus ordered the attorneys to return half of their already-court-approved, and paid, flat fee.

In In re: Dennis Molnar, 19-bk-09525, 2024 WL 190919 (Jan. 17, 2024 N.D, Ill.), the debtor filed a petition seeking relief under chapter 13. Originally, three attorneys from the same firm represented the debtor. The attorneys appeared pursuant to a “no look,” flat-fee program for chapter 13 debtors’ attorneys.

After years of litigation involving state, federal, Irish, and (to a lesser extent) Swiss law; transfers of numerous assets, including Ireland’s priciest-personal residence; a jury trial; and extensive post-trial briefing, the Second Circuit made short shrift of a former real estate mogul and his ex-wife’s appeal of a judgment rendered against them for fraudulent conveyances.

Bankruptcy Judge James J. Tancredi appeared to give a chapter 7 debtor one last chance to avoid being incarcerated.

When he was appointed by the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Peter D. Russin probably did not expect to have to decide who has rights to the Twitter, Instagram, and TikTok handles associated with social-media-forward energy-drink brands. But that is exactly what Judge Russin did in a recent opinion related to the bankruptcy of “Bang” energy drink’s manufacturer, Vital Pharmaceutical, Inc.

简介

最近在Re Guy Kwok-Hung Lam [2023] HKCFA 9一案中，香港终审法院澄清，如果受争议的呈请债务所涉及的协议载有专属司法管辖权条款（「专属条款」），法院应如何处理清盘及破产呈请。

案情

上诉人于2017年与CP Global Inc（「该公司」）及答辩人订立了一份信贷及担保协议（「信贷协议」）。据此，上诉人向该公司提供定期贷款，答辩人就该公司结欠上诉人的所有款项提供个人担保。信贷协议载有专属条款，就该协议所产生或与之有关的所有法律程序赋予纽约法院专属司法管辖权。

于2020年，上诉人认为发生了信贷协议所指的违约事件，故要求答辩人支付信贷协议项下的未偿还本金及利息。答辩人未有按上诉人的要求还款，因此上诉人在香港针对答辩人展开破产法律程序。另一方面，答辩人在纽约提起诉讼，请求法院求宣告并无发生信贷协议下的违约事件。

答辩人反对在香港提出破产呈请的主要理由之一，是专属条款规定上诉人须首先在纽约法院就双方争议进行诉讼，然后才可在香港展开破产程序。

Introduction

In the latest judgment handed down by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Re Guy Kwok-Hung Lam [2023] HKCFA 9, the Court of Final Appeal clarified the approach to winding up and bankruptcy petitions where the agreement from which the disputed petition debt arose contains an exclusive jurisdiction clause (“EJC”).

Facts