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Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

This isn’t going to end well.

Looks like our bankruptcy system in these United States is about to take a big hit—to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars (projected to be around $350 million). And those responsible for creating the debacle are going to skate.

Here’s how.

U.S. Trustee v. John Q. Hammons

The United States Trustee Program is responsible for the efficient administration of bankruptcy cases throughout most of the country. Since 1986, the Trustee Program has covered all states except North Carolina and Alabama, where an Administrator Program oversees bankruptcy filings instead. Although there are many similarities between the two programs, there is a significant difference in the funding structure. The Trustee Program is entirely self-funded through quarterly fees paid by debtors that file in the Trustee Program districts.

Here’s a Bankruptcy Court opinion addressing a no-discharge claim under § 1141(d)(3) against an individual debtor who proposes a liquidating Subchapter V plan:

  • RGW Construction, Inc. v. Lucido (In re Lucido), Adv. No. 21-4031, Northern California Bankruptcy Court (issued 9/13/2023, Doc. 113).

The Issue

Question

Once a Subchapter V debtor is removed from possession under § 1185(a), what happens next?

The answer to this question seems to have evolved over the few years of Subchapter V’s existence:

  • from a low-power position for debtor, early-on;
  • to a high-power position for debtor, in a re-thought view; and
  • then back to the low-power position for debtor, when problems of the re-thought view become evident.

I’ll try to explain.

Early Answer

The equitable mootness doctrine is before the U.S. Supreme Court on a Petition for writ of certiorari. The case is U.S. Bank National Association v. Windstream Holdings, Inc.[Fn. 1]

All who’ve seen an effort to abuse equitable mootness, from a creditor’s view, will appreciate the following information from U.S. Bank’s Petition and from a supporting Amicus Brief of law professors in U.S. Bank v. Windstream.

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitate the development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

  • From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

  • From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.