In the August 2017 issue of Debt Dialogue, we discussed the recent decision by Judge Martin Glenn of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York with respect to claims brought by the litigation trust (the Trust) established in the bankruptcy case of LyondellBasell Industries AF S.C.A. (LBI) against Access Industries, Inc.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently overturned its own prior guidance to hold that an official creditors’ committee had an unconditional statutory right to intervene in an adversary proceeding. The First Circuit joined the Second and Third Circuits to recognize that the right to intervene provided by the Bankruptcy Code is not limited to the main bankruptcy case, contrary to the long-standing rule in the Fifth Circuit. However, the First Circuit also held that the scope of intervention may be qualified, with limits set by the trial court on a case-by-case basis.

Unlike an opinion, an order of the court is often not from the pen of the judge. Typically, a court order is submitted to the judge after negotiation among the parties. So, when a disagreement arises among the parties regarding the interpretation of the court’s order, how does the judge who signed the order go about resolving the matter? The issue came up not long ago in Outer Harbor Terminal LLC (Bkr. D. Del. May, 5, 2017), in which Judge Laurie Silverstein of the District of  Delaware bankruptcy court was confronted with a dispute over her own final DIP order.

In the May 2017 issue of Debt Dialogue, we discussed the recent decision by Judge Martin Glenn of the U.S.

Just one year after Lyondell Chemical Company (Lyondell) and Basell AF (Basell) consummated a nearly $20 billion merger of their businesses, the merged business of LyondellBasell Industries (LBI) “failed in a colossal manner.”1 As part of the bankruptcy process that followed, a court-appointed litigation trust (the Trust) filed suit for the benefit of unsecured creditors against numerous parties involved in the merger, bringing actual a

Part 1 of this series described the recent decision of the ISDA Americas Determinations Committee to declare that a “failure to pay” had occurred with respect to iHeartCommunications Inc., notwithstanding that the only non-payment had been to a wholly owned subsidiary. The non-payment was orchestrated to avoid a springing lien that would have been triggered had all the notes of a particular issue of iHeartCommunications debt been paid in full. It did not reflect on the creditworthiness of iHeartCommunications.

As the saga of the Paragon Offshore plc bankruptcy (Bankr. D. Del., No. 16-10386 (CSS)) continues, it is useful to reflect upon Judge Sontchi’s denial of confirmation of its bankruptcy plan last November. In a 70-page ruling examining the feasibility of the plan in detail, Judge Sontchi concluded that the plan proposed by the debtors was not feasible because their business plan was not reasonable, and Paragon would not be able to refinance its debt in 2021 at maturity. Balance sheet solvency upon exit was not prioritized in the court’s analysis.

In our e-updates of 20 January 2010 and 16 August 2010, we looked at decisions of the English and Scottish courts from December 2009 and August 2010 in which it was decided that, in England and Scotland respectively, the Administrators of a tenant company are bound to account to the landlord of premises for rent due in relation to the period during which those premises are being u

Our government has a longstanding commitment to cutting red tape. One of the ways of doing this it seems is to propose an Act of Parliament running to 153 pages. Thus we are presented with the Deregulation Bill.

A few of the provisions of this Bill relate to insolvency. The most significant are:

Appeal Judges in the Court of Session yesterday issued a decision directing that the liquidators of Scottish Coal Company (SCC) cannot abandon sites or disclaim statutory licences imposing obligations on the company.