The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in Picard v. Citibank, in which the petitioner sought review of a Second Circuit decision on a seemingly obscure point of law: the pleading burden for “good faith” under Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Second Circuit’s decision is part of, and highlights, a larger, systemic problem in the evolution of bankruptcy law over the last decade—the multiplication of trustee-friendly interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code that, when combined, leave innocent subsequent transferees unfairly vulnerable to meritless clawback suits.

Before 1st October 2021, French law did not provide for the possibility to cram down shareholders, other than under Article L. 631-19-2 of the French Commercial Code, which sets conditions which are so stringent that it is not used in practice.

Directive 2019/2023 has let EU member states decide whether shareholders should be a class of “affected parties” subject to cross-class cram down or whether other measures should be implemented to avoid shareholders preventing, or making it difficult, in an unreasonable manner, the approval of a restructuring plan.