Since 1993, decisions out of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York consistently adopted the aggregate “rent approach” for calculating lease rejection damages in bankruptcy proceedings. But in Bankruptcy Judge Wiles’ recent decision in In re Cortlandt Liquidating LLC, he departed from the “rent approach” in favor of the “time approach,” which is based on the time remaining under the lease rather than factoring in the total or aggregate rent still owed under the lease.
In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.
In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina
It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .
On August 11, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed lower court decisions rejecting Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.’s (“LBSF”) attempt to recover nearly $1 billion in payments to noteholders and enforcing certain Priority Provisions (defined below) that subordinated payments otherwise payable to LBSF under related swap transactions.
I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.
Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.
Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by
State governments can be creditors of individuals, businesses and institutions that are debtors in bankruptcy in a variety of ways, most notably as tax and fine collectors but also as lenders. They can also be debtors of debtors, in their role, for example, as the purchasers of vast quantities of goods and services on credit. And they can also be transferees of a debtor’s property in (at least) every role in which they can be creditors.
We have noodled on the impact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Merit Management Group, LP v.