Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

In Shameeka Ien v. TransCare Corp., et al. (In re TransCareCorp.), Case No. 16-10407, Adv. P. No. 16-01033 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2020) [D.I. 157], the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently refused to dismiss WARN Act claims against Patriarch Partners, LLC, private equity firm (“PE Firm“), and its owner, Lynn Tilton (“PE Owner“), resulting from the staggered chapter 7 bankruptcies of several portfolio companies, TransCare Corporation and its affiliates (collectively, the “Debtors“).

Joining three other bankruptcy courts, Judge Thuma of the District of New Mexico recently held that the rules issued by the Small Business Administration (“SBA“) that restrict bankrupt entities from participating in the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP“) violated the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, H.R. 748, P.L. 115-136 (the “CARES Act”), as well as section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Southern District of New York recently reminded us in In re Firestar Diamond, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-10509 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 22, 2019) (SHL) [Dkt. No. 1482] that equitable principles in bankruptcy often do not match those outside of bankruptcy. Indeed, bankruptcy decisions often place emphasis on equality of treatment amongst all creditors and are less concerned with inequities to individual creditors.

Introduction

Un emprunteur qui, sans en avoir le droit, ne paierait pas l'échéance d'un crédit entre le 12 mars 2020 et l'expiration d'un délai d'un mois à compter de la date de cessation de l'état d'urgence sanitaire (lui-même censé durer deux mois à compter du 24 mars 2020 sauf report), pourrait arguer que la clause d'exigibilité anticipée du crédit et la clause d'intérêts de retard (une clause pénale) ne pourront produire leurs effets qu'à compter de l'expiration de cette période en application de l'ordonnance n° 2020-306 du 25 mars 2020 prise en application de la loi d'urgence n° 2020-290 du 23 mars

A borrower who, without having the right to do so, would not pay a credit instalment due between 12 March 2020 and one month after the end of the state of health emergency (which is supposed to last two months as from 24 March 2020 but could be extended), could argue that the loan documents' acceleration clause and default interest clause (a liquidated damage clause) shall only take effect after that period pursuant to Ordinance No. 2020-306 of 25 March 2020, adopted further to the "emergency" Law No. 2020-290 of 23 March 2020.

A borrower who, without having the right to do so, would not pay a credit instalment due between 12 March 2020 and one month after the end of the state of health emergency (which is supposed to last two months as from 24 March 2020 but could be extended), could argue that the loan documents' acceleration clause and default interest clause (a liquidated damage clause) shall only take effect after that period pursuant to Ordinance No. 2020-306 of 25 March 2020, adopted further to the "emergency" Law No. 2020-290 of 23 March 2020.

In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., f/b/o Jerome Guyant, IRA v. Highland Construction Management Services, L.P. et al., Nos. 18-2450-52 (4th Cir. March 17, 2020), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld that a borrower’s indirect economic interests in a limited liability company (LLC) were not assigned to a lender under a conveyance in a security agreement assigning mere membership interests, pursuant to Virginia state law.

Facts