On March 26, 2020, leave to appeal the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal (the “Alberta CA”) in Canada v. Canada North Group Inc.¹ (“Canada North Group”) was granted by the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”).² No reasons were given.

INTRODUCTION 

The Supreme Court has recently in its judgment dated 21 January 2020, in the case of Standard Chartered Bank v MSTC Limited [SLP (C) No 20093 of 2019], provided clarity on the interplay between the provisions of Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act 1993 (RDB Act) and Limitation Act 1963 (Limitation Act). Supreme Court has in doing so refused to condone a delay of 28 days in filing of a review application by the government borrower entity against a decree in favour of the bank.  

BRIEF BACKGROUND: 

The Quebec Court of Appeal’s unanimous decision in Gestion Éric Savard¹ reaffirms the super-priority ranking of CCAA² DIP financing³ over regular unpaid post-filing obligations, absent steps being taken to reverse this usual order of priorities.

In Canada v. Canada North Group Inc., 2019 ABCA 314, the Court of Appeal of Alberta (the “ABCA”) upheld the decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta (the “Lower Court”), which held that the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) permits courts to subordinate statutory deemed trusts in favour of the Crown to court-ordered insolvency priming charges.

On November 1, 2019, a number of amendments to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”) and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) will come into force pursuant to the Canadian federal government’s budget implementation legislation for 2018 and 2019.

The Supreme Court in its recent decision in K Kishan v M/s Vijay Nirman Company Private Limited, Civil Appeal No 21825 of 2017, has put to rest the question of whether an arbitral award that has been challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act) by the award debtor can form the basis for an action under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code).

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]