The appointment of an independent director is a powerful tool for private credit lenders. The appointment is designed to introduce a voice of neutrality and fairness into the board’s decision-making process with the hope and expectation that independence from the controlling shareholder enables the board to drive toward viable value-maximizing strategies. Often times, the independent director is vested with exclusive authority (or veto rights) over a range of significant corporate decisions, including a sale, restructuring and the decision to file a bankruptcy case.
One common denominator links nearly all stressed businesses: tight liquidity. After the liquidity hole is identified and sized, the discussion inevitably turns to the question of who will fund the necessary capital to extend the liquidity runway. For a PE-backed business where there is a credible path to recovery, a sponsor, due to its existing equity stake, is often willing to inject additional capital into an underperforming portfolio company.
In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that unsecured noteholders’ claims against a debtor for certain “Applicable Premiums” were the “economic equivalent” to unmatured interest and, therefore, not recoverable under section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Building on emerging trends, 2024 has seen a continued rise in the use of equity-linked debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing in Chapter 11 cases.
Recent examples from WeWork and Enviva illustrate how stakeholders are leveraging this innovative tool to drive broader reorganization strategies and outcomes rather than as a mechanism solely providing interim financing to fund a debtor’s operations during the pendency of its bankruptcy case.
WeWork
Building on emerging trends, 2024 has seen a continued rise in the use of equity-linked debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing in Chapter 11 cases.
Recent examples from WeWork and Enviva illustrate how stakeholders are leveraging this innovative tool to drive broader reorganization strategies and outcomes rather than as a mechanism solely providing interim financing to fund a debtor’s operations during the pendency of its bankruptcy case.
WeWork
On May 31, 2024, the chief judge of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) entered General Order M-634, adopting guidelines for combining the processes for Chapter 11 plan confirmation under Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code and disclosure statement approval under Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code.
As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.
There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.
On January 22, 2024, the chief judge of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered General Order M-621 adopting amended procedural guidelines governing prepackaged Chapter 11 cases.
The guidelines provide a comprehensive framework for the administration of prepackaged Chapter 11 cases in the district. Among other things, they recognize and address “Rapid Prepackaged Chapter 11 Case[s],” defined as cases “where the Debtor seeks confirmation of the plan to be granted between one (1) and fourteen (14) days after the petition date.”
Bankruptcy Considerations for Unitranche Transactions with Super-Priority Revolvers without an AAL