Hello again.

Most of the Court of Appeal civil decisions this week were procedural in nature.  Topics included the standard of review of discretionary orders (deference), municipal law, leave to appeal and stays pending appeal in the CCAA context and the consolidation of appeals to the Court of Appeal as of right with Divisional Court appeals requiring leave.

Have a nice weekend.

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Pickering (City) v. Slade, 2016 ONCA 133

Section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides for a general moratorium on legal proceedings against a company in business rescue.

I wrote an article published in the June issue of Without Prejudice in which this question was considered. I criticised the then binding judgment of Chetty t/a Nationwide Electrical v Hart NO and Another (12559/2012) [20141 ZAKZDHC 9 (25 March 2014), as it was held in that case that arbitration proceedings do not constitute legal proceedings for purposes of section 133 of the Act.

Hello again for another week,

Can a creditor cancel an agreement with a company in business rescue and what is the consequence of a business rescue practitioner suspending an agreement before cancellation?

The lawfulness of cancelling a contract during business rescue

The advent of the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) brought with it a shift from a creditor-protectionist society towards a business rescue model that is debtor-protectionist. In consequence, there has been a swarm of applications taking advantage and exploiting this new scheme. This shift has unfortunately led to considerable abuse of the business rescue procedure.

It is common practice to find directors of a company standing surety for the company in order to secure its debts. The consequence could be severe for the sureties, because if the company is unable to pay its debt, the creditor can take legal action against the directors or other third parties in their capacity as sureties, unless the company pays its debts and the sureties are released from liability.

Section 153 (1)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) is intended to afford a remedy to affected persons who support a business rescue plan that has been 

The section can be broken down into five key elements:

In this article we investigate whether, in South African law, a subordination agreement could constitute a "voidable disposition" as defined in section 26 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (the Act). 
 
Section 26 of the Act provides that every disposition of property not made for value may be set aside by the court, if the disposition was made by an insolvent (whether an individual, company or close corporation) either: 
 

The Supreme Court of Canada, in a decision that has implications for borrowers and lenders alike, particularly where pension funds are involved, has raised some new hurdles for the country’s banks and their business customers and, at the same time, has bolstered protection for lenders of last resort who finance insolvent companies.

The court’s decision in Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steelworkers, issued earlier this year, addresses critical questions in insolvency law regarding pension funds and DIP financing.