Setting aside a transaction on the basis that it was an extortionate credit transaction under the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986 or the “Act”) is difficult. A bargain may be hard or even unreasonable, but that does not make it extortionate. The most important term to any credit transaction is usually the interest rate and that is most likely to be subject to scrutiny when considering whether or not a credit transaction contained grossly exorbitant terms.
A recent decision of the Court has confirmed that the recipient of funds from an individual who is subject to a bankruptcy petition can be construed as having provided value where that value is given to a third party (and not to the bankrupt personally).
Roger Elford and Jessica Williams in the Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency team at Charles Russell Speechlys LLP acted for a successful Respondent, Howard de Walden Estates Limited, in these proceedings.
The Background
The Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 has brought much needed clarity to the legal basis and scope of the so-called ‘reflective loss’ principle. The effect of the decision is a ‘bright line’ rule that bars claims by shareholders for loss in value of their shares arising as a consequence of the company having suffered loss, in respect of which the company has a cause of action against the same wrong-doer.
The Government has announced proposals for retrospective changes for the urgent reforms to UK insolvency law, designed to protect companies and their directors during the COVID-19 outbreak.
Wrongful trading
These changes will include a temporary suspension (to the end of June 2020) of section 214 Insolvency Act 1986 in relation to wrongful trading, subject to passage of the upcoming Corporate Insolvency & Governance Bill through Parliament in the coming weeks.
A recent decision of the High Court of New Zealand provides helpful guidance for insolvency practitioners on how aspects of the voluntary administration regime should operate in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
On 30 March 2020, the board of directors of EncoreFX (NZ) Limited resolved to appoint administrators to the company. By then, New Zealand was already at Level 4 on the four-level alert system for COVID-19.
On Saturday 28 March, Secretary of State for the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Alok Sharma, announced a proposal for the urgent reforms to UK insolvency law, designed to protect companies and their directors during the COVID-19 outbreak.
Wrongful Trading (section 214 Insolvency Act 1986)
It was announced that there would be a temporary suspension of section 214 Insolvency Act 1986 in relation to wrongful trading.
The UK Court of Appeal has held that legal privilege outlasts the dissolution of a company in Addlesee v Dentons Europe LLP [2019] EWCA Civ 1600.
Legal advice privilege applies to communications between a client and its lawyers. The general rule is that those communications cannot be disclosed to third parties unless and until the client waives the privilege.
The High Court in DHC Assets Ltd v Arnerich [2019] NZHC 1695 recently considered an application under s 301 of the Companies Act (the Act) seeking to recover $1,088,156 against the former director of a liquidated company (Vaco). The plaintiff had a construction contract with Vaco and said it had not been paid for all the work it performed under that contract.
Regan v Brougham [2019] NZCA 401 clarifies what is needed to establish a valid guarantee.
A Term Loan Agreement was entered into whereby Christine Regan and Mark Tuffin lent $50,000 to B & R Enterprises Ltd. Rachael Dey and Bryce Brougham were named as Guarantors. Bryce Brougham was the only guarantor to sign the agreement. The Company was put into liquidation and a demand made against the Guarantor.
The guarantor argued that the guarantee was not enforceable based on the following:
The Court of Appeal in 90 Nine Limited v Luxury Rentals NZ Limited [2019] NZCA 424 allowed an appeal from a creditor in respect of an application to liquidate the respondent over a failure to pay a statutory demand.