In Mclean v Trustees of the Bankruptcy Estate of Dent [2016] EWHC 2650, the High Court considered the application of the equitable doctrines of marshalling and subrogation in relation to a fixed charge over (among other things) a dog.

A company and partnership borrowed funds from two sources – Barclays Bank and Lady Morrison. Barclays held, among other things, charges over farms owned by individual partners and an agricultural charge under the Agricultural Credits Act 1928 (UK), including a charge over a dog. Lady Morrison only held charges over the farms.

In Day v The Official Assignee as Liquidator of GN Networks Ltd (in Liq) [2016] NZHC 2400, the High Court rejected a claim that the funding arrangement at issue constituted maintenance or champerty.

It seems only fitting that recent decisions by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and its bankruptcy court regarding the nature of electricity should have sent, at least initially, a jolt through the energy community.  Perhaps the Southern District court would lead the charge for one side or the other in an ongoing debate over whether electricity constitutes goods or services—a controversy that has potentially far-reaching implications (in bankruptcy cases, concerning the priority of claims of electricity providers, and, in ordinary transactions, for