When it comes to voting on a plan, Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court may designate (or disallow) the votes of any entity whose vote to accept or reject was not made in “good faith” (a term that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).

In an action against a Florida consumer plaintiffs’ firm that also functions as consumer bankruptcy debtors’ counsel, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy attorney violates section 526(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code if he instructs a client to pay his legal fees using a credit card.

In so ruling, the Court held that there is no requirement under the statute that the advice be given for an invalid purpose designed to manipulate the bankruptcy process.

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the trial court from considering the plaintiff’s claims because she was not challenging or seeking to set aside an underlying non-judicial mortgage foreclosure proceeding under Colorado law.

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit remanded to the trial court to determine what effect, if any, the non-judicial proceeding had under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held, in a case of first impression, that “the Bankruptcy Code authorizes payment of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by debtors in successfully pursuing an action for damages resulting from the violation of the automatic stay and in defending the damages award on appeal.”

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta

On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.

The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District, recently reversed the dismissal of a mortgage foreclosure action based on res judicata and the statute of limitations, holding that the Florida Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Association and its progeny controlled.

In so ruling, the Court confirmed that a second foreclosure action is not barred by the statute of limitations or res judicata where continuing payment defaults occurred within the five years preceding the filing of the second foreclosure action. 

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s holding that a creditor held an unenforceable lien against a debtor’s real property because the property was owned by the entireties and the lien was thus avoidable under Bankruptcy Code § 522(f)(1). 

A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion.