Before 1st October 2021, French law did not provide for the possibility to cram down shareholders, other than under Article L. 631-19-2 of the French Commercial Code, which sets conditions which are so stringent that it is not used in practice.
Directive 2019/2023 has let EU member states decide whether shareholders should be a class of “affected parties” subject to cross-class cram down or whether other measures should be implemented to avoid shareholders preventing, or making it difficult, in an unreasonable manner, the approval of a restructuring plan.
Following the judgments in recent years on attribution to a company of its directors' knowledge in Bilta (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23 and UBS AG (London Branch) and another v Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig [2017] EWCA Civ 1567, the UK Supreme Court has once more returned to this issue in Singularis Holdings Ltd (in Official Liquidation) (a Company Incorporated in The Cayman Islands) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd [2019] UKSC 50, in a case where a bank (Daiwa) was held liable for breaching its Quincecare duty of care to its customer,
English courts recognise that shareholders hold a separate legal personality from the body corporate they own a stake in and will only go behind the corporate veil in limited circumstances. In the recent case of Onur Air Taşimacilik AŞ v Goldtrail Travel Ltd (In Liquidation) 1 , the Court of Appeal considered whether the financial means of the appellant’s wealthy controlling shareholder could be taken into account when making an order that the appellant had to make a substantial payment into court as a condition of being able to pursue its appeal.