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The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 has introduced a new standalone moratorium procedure for companies.1 The moratorium is part of a package of significant legislative reforms contained in the Act, intended to enhance the UK’s restructuring rescue culture. These were originally consulted on between 2016 and 2018 and were fast-tracked to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.

Overview

The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 has introduced a new standalone moratorium procedure for companies.1 The moratorium is part of a package of significant legislative reforms contained in the Act, intended to enhance the UK’s restructuring rescue culture. These were originally consulted on between 2016 and 2018 and were fast-tracked to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.

Overview

The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill introduces a new standalone moratorium procedure for companies. The moratorium is part of a package of significant legislative reforms contained in the Bill and intended to enhance the UK’s restructuring rescue culture. These were originally consulted on in 2018 and have now been fast-tracked to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.

Following the judgments in recent years on attribution to a company of its directors' knowledge in Bilta (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23 and UBS AG (London Branch) and another v Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig [2017] EWCA Civ 1567, the UK Supreme Court has once more returned to this issue in Singularis Holdings Ltd (in Official Liquidation) (a Company Incorporated in The Cayman Islands) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd [2019] UKSC 50, in a case where a bank (Daiwa) was held liable for breaching its Quincecare duty of care to its customer,

English courts recognise that shareholders hold a separate legal personality from the body corporate they own a stake in and will only go behind the corporate veil in limited circumstances. In the recent case of Onur Air Taşimacilik AŞ v Goldtrail Travel Ltd (In Liquidation) 1 , the Court of Appeal considered whether the financial means of the appellant’s wealthy controlling shareholder could be taken into account when making an order that the appellant had to make a substantial payment into court as a condition of being able to pursue its appeal.