Asset freeze measures enacted by the United Kingdom against designated persons (DPs) can, under certain circumstances, extend to entities “owned or controlled” by DPs. To date, there have been few—and at times partly contradictory—English court cases addressing the “ownership and control” criteria under the UK sanctions regime. The latest judgment in Hellard v OJSC Rossiysky Kredit Bank sought to reconcile the previous guidance provided by the courts in the Mints and Litasco cases.
An insolvency moratorium first introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic applies to nearly all Russian legal entities, individuals, and sole entrepreneurs, and bans the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Russian obligors.
In response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, Russia has changed its bankruptcy laws to provide for a moratorium on bankruptcies and a freeze on certain transactions. While the situation is dynamic, these amendments are relevant for ongoing or potential transactions in Russia, as well as a party’s ability to enforce pledges and other types of security interests or to seek other remedies against Russian companies.
Following the judgments in recent years on attribution to a company of its directors' knowledge in Bilta (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23 and UBS AG (London Branch) and another v Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig [2017] EWCA Civ 1567, the UK Supreme Court has once more returned to this issue in Singularis Holdings Ltd (in Official Liquidation) (a Company Incorporated in The Cayman Islands) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd [2019] UKSC 50, in a case where a bank (Daiwa) was held liable for breaching its Quincecare duty of care to its customer,
English courts recognise that shareholders hold a separate legal personality from the body corporate they own a stake in and will only go behind the corporate veil in limited circumstances. In the recent case of Onur Air Taşimacilik AŞ v Goldtrail Travel Ltd (In Liquidation) 1 , the Court of Appeal considered whether the financial means of the appellant’s wealthy controlling shareholder could be taken into account when making an order that the appellant had to make a substantial payment into court as a condition of being able to pursue its appeal.