The new Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill will introduce new provisions to protect a company from suppliers wishing to terminate supply contracts or invoking more draconian terms when the company is entering into certain insolvency procedures, a CVA, or a new restructuring plan or moratorium (as introduced by the Bill), (each an “Insolvency Procedure”).
The purpose behind the new provisions is to maximise the possibility of a company being rescued or being able to sell its business as a going concern by helping it to trade through an Insolvency Procedure.
Last week the UK government introduced the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill in Parliament.
The main objective of the Bill is to provide businesses with the flexibility and space needed to continue to trade during this difficult time caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. That said, the provisions around the new moratorium and the new restructuring plan proposal have been under consideration for a few years.
The Bill’s measures can be split into three categories:
Wrongful Trading
On 14 May 2020, the UK Government extended the temporary suspension of wrongful trading liability until 30 June 2020.
Following the judgments in recent years on attribution to a company of its directors' knowledge in Bilta (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23 and UBS AG (London Branch) and another v Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig [2017] EWCA Civ 1567, the UK Supreme Court has once more returned to this issue in Singularis Holdings Ltd (in Official Liquidation) (a Company Incorporated in The Cayman Islands) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd [2019] UKSC 50, in a case where a bank (Daiwa) was held liable for breaching its Quincecare duty of care to its customer,
English courts recognise that shareholders hold a separate legal personality from the body corporate they own a stake in and will only go behind the corporate veil in limited circumstances. In the recent case of Onur Air Taşimacilik AŞ v Goldtrail Travel Ltd (In Liquidation) 1 , the Court of Appeal considered whether the financial means of the appellant’s wealthy controlling shareholder could be taken into account when making an order that the appellant had to make a substantial payment into court as a condition of being able to pursue its appeal.