On June 20, 2018, Judge Kevin J. Carey of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware sustained an objection to a proof of claim filed by a postpetition debt purchaser premised on anti-assignment clauses contained in transferred promissory notes. In re Woodbridge Group of Companies, LLC, et al., No. 17-12560, at *14 (jointly administered) (Bankr. D. Del. Jun. 20, 2018).
Summary
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut recently examined a question at the heart of an existing circuit split regarding the consequences of trademark license rejection in bankruptcy: can a trademark licensee retain the use of a licensed trademark post-rejection? In re SIMA International, Inc., 2018 WL 2293705 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 17, 2018).
On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper application of the safe harbor set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a provision that prohibits the avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was made in connection with a securities contract and made by or to (or for the benefit of) certain qualified entities, including a financial institution.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.
Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.
Winding up petition struck out as an abuse of process where the court was not satisfied that the petitioner was a creditor.
Can a company file a notice of intention to appoint an administrator (NOI) if administration is just one of a number of potential options being explored for rescuing the company?
Are funds subject to an IVA if they are received by a debtor after a certificate of completion has been issued by the supervisor?
Should an administrator’s appointment be terminated where the motives of the appointor are improper but the statutory purpose of the administration can still be properly achieved?