The U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral argument today inU.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge (15-1509). At issue in the case is whether the appropriate standard of review for determining non-statutory insider status is the de novo standard of review applied by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 3rd, 7th and 10th Circuits, or the clearly erroneous standard of review adopted for the first time by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Village at Lake Ridge.

In In re Short Bark Industries Inc., 17-11502 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017), Judge Kevin Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware read the Supreme Court’s holding in Jevic narrowly in connection with a settlement of a dispute on DIP financing.

The bankruptcy bar is abuzz following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 15-649, 2017 BL 89680, 85 U.S.L.W. 4115 (Sup. Ct. March 22, 2017), holding that bankruptcy courts may not approve structured dismissals that do not adhere to the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.

Until 2013, no circuit court of appeals had weighed in on the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the 203 North LaSalle case that property retained by a junior stakeholder under a cram-down chapter 11 plan in exchange for new value “without benefit of market valuation” violates the “absolute priority rule.” See Bank of Amer. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), reversing Matter of 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997).

2012 is shaping up as a year of bankruptcy first impressions for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals sailed into uncharted bankruptcy waters twice already this year in the same chapter 11 case. On January 24, the court ruled in In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 2012 WL 178998 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012) ("Thorpe I"), that an appeal by certain nonsettling asbestos insurers of an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not equitably moot because, among other things, the plan had not been "substantially consummated" under the court's novel construction of that statutory term.