In an opinion issued on Sept. 20 by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico, Judge David T. Thuma held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prevent a bankruptcy court from determining whether the automatic stay applies to pending state court litigation. See In re Shook, Case No. 24-10724-t7 (Bankr. N.M. Sept. 20, 2024) [ECF No. 54].

One of the significant risks that creditors weigh when deciding whether to lend money is bankruptcy risk: can the borrower use the bankruptcy laws to discharge the debt or compel the creditor to accept less than it bargained for? In the sovereign debt market, it has been an article of faith for creditors that states cannot file for bankruptcy and obtain such relief. But a recent ruling from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York—Hamilton Reserve Bank v.

In Matter of Imperial Petroleum Recovery Corp., 84 F.4th 264 (5th Cir. 2023), the Fifth Circuit was asked to address whether 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) – the federal statute providing for post-judgment interest – applies in adversary proceedings even though 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) doesn’t explicitly refer to bankruptcy courts.

In earlier posts, the Red Zone has discussed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 142 S. Ct. 1770 (2022), which held that increased U.S.

In Matter of Texxon Petrochemicals, L.L.C., 67 F.4th 259 (5th Cir. 2023), the Fifth Circuit held that even if an appeal is equitably moot, the appellate court nonetheless has appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal, without reaching the issue of equitable mootness.

Section 503(b)(9) Overview

On April 17, 2023, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Matter of RE Palm Springs II, L.L.C., 2023 WL 2966520 (5th Cir. April 17, 2023), held that a senior lender who uses economic leverage and asserts its legal rights to squeeze out a junior lender remains a good faith purchaser entitled to declare an appeal moot based on a sale under section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code. Key to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion was the fact that the actions in question were disclosed to the bankruptcy court in advance of it making the section 363(m) finding.

Facts

What does it mean to own something? When should the law acknowledge that somebody really owns something, even if they don't formally own it?

And when will courts recognize the economic reality that one person — say, a judgment debtor — in truth owns something, notwithstanding that person's painstaking efforts to keep formal legal title in the hands of others?

The law has long recognized doctrines to disregard the existence, or pierc the veil, of corporate entities to which a debtor has transferred assets.

In a previous blog post from June 2022, we discussed the Tenth Circuit’s post-Sigel decision in John Q. Hammons Fall 2006 LLC v. U.S. Trustee (In re John Q. Hammons Fall 2006 LLC), 15 F.4th 1011 (10th Cir. Oct. 5, 2021), which held that the government must pay a refund to a Chapter 11 debtor based on what the debtor would have paid over the same time were the case in a Bankruptcy Administrator district.

Two recent decisions from circuit courts of appeal – the Fifth and Ninth – have addressed a question that does not arise often: in a solvent-debtor chapter 11 case, is the debtor required to pay post-petition interest (commonly referred to as “pendency interest”) to unsecured creditors in order to render such claims unimpaired? And, if so, what is the applicable rate of interest to use? Additionally, a subsequent decision from the Second Circuit, while not ultimately reaching the issue, favorably cited the recent Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions.