In Short
The Situation: Circuit courts were split on whether mere retention by a creditor of estate property violates the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The U.S. Supreme Court considered the question inCity of Chicago v. Fulton, in which the City of Chicago had refused to return debtors' vehicles after they filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee to avoid certain transfers of a debtor's property and to recover the property or its value from the transferees is an essential tool in maximizing the value of a bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, a ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit could, if followed by other courts, curtail a trustee's avoidance and recovery powers. In Rajala v. Spencer Fane LLP (In re Generation Resources Holding Co.), 964 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 2020), reh'g denied, No.
Introduction
Derivative Standing
Dura Automotive
The Bankruptcy Court's Ruling
The McClatchy Company
Outlook
The practice of conferring "derivative standing" on official creditors' committees to assert claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate in cases where the debtor or a bankruptcy trustee is unwilling or unable to do so is a well-established means of generating value for the estate from litigation recoveries. However, in a series of recent decisions, the Delaware bankruptcy courts have limited the practice in cases where applicable non-bankruptcy state law provides that creditors do not have standing to bring claims on behalf of certain entities.
The government recently published its Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill which includes a temporary “ban” on statutory demands. In its current form, the ban will prevent landlords and other creditors from relying on statutory demands served between 1 March and 1 month after the Bill becomes law. The Bill also includes provision to prevent the winding up of companies where their inability to pay is due to Covid 19.
Temporary provisions restricting action to wind up companies and reverse some winding up orders already made are a step closer following presentation of the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill (“Bill”) to the House of Commons on 20 May. The Bill will now work its way through both Houses before imminently becoming law. The Bill includes a number of substantial corporate insolvency changes, but also temporary provisions restricting action to wind up companies in light of Covid-19, on which we focus here.
The Situation: In the past few weeks, due to the severe impact of the COVID-19 crisis on non-essential businesses forced to close and terminate employees after filing for chapter 11 protection, bankruptcy courts have been confronted with requests by debtors to temporarily suspend their bankruptcy cases using the courts' equitable powers and a seldom-used provision of the Bankruptcy Code: 11 U.S.C. § 305(a).
In This Issue:
U.S. Supreme Court: Creditors May Immediately Appeal Denials of Automatic-Stay Relief
Last September we reported on the Court’s decision on the landlords’ challenge to the Debenhams CVA on grounds of unfair prejudice and material irregularity, in respect of which the landlords have now successfully obtained permission to appeal on various grounds (see below).
In McKillen v. Wallace (In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Ltd.), 2019 WL 4740249 (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2019), the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware had an opportunity to consider, as an apparent matter of first impression, whether the U.S. common law "Barton Doctrine" applies extraterritorially. One of the issues considered by the district court on appeal was whether parties attempting to sue a foreign representative in a chapter 15 case must first obtain permission to sue from the foreign court that appointed the foreign representative.