The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.

On December 12, 2011, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in a case raising the question of whether a debtor's chapter 11 plan is confirmable when it proposes an auction sale of a secured creditor's assets free and clear of liens without permitting that creditor to "credit bid" its claims but instead provides the creditor with the "indubitable equivalent" of its secured claim. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166 (cert. granted Dec. 12, 2011).

Earlier this year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided in In re Lett that objections to a bankruptcy court’s approval of a cram-down chapter 11 plan on the basis of noncompliance with the “absolute priority rule” may be raised for the first time on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that “[a] bankruptcy court has an independent obligation to ensure that a proposed plan complies with [the] absolute priority rule before ‘cramming’ that plan down upon dissenting creditor classes,” whether or not stakeholders “formally” object on that basis.

InJ.D. Brian Ltd (in liquidation) & Others the High Court held that, where a floating charge crystallised prior to the commencement of a winding-up, the preferential creditors still had priority pursuant to in section 285 of the Companies Act 1963 over the holder of what had become a fixed charge.

The English court of appeal has held that a company should not be held to be balance sheet insolvent on the sole basis that its liabilities (including contingent and prospective liabilities) exceed its assets.

In BNY Corporate Trustee Services v Eurosail & Ors, the Court of Appeal considered in detail, for the first time, the construction of section 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, which sets out circumstances in which a company can be deemed to be unable to pay its debts.

The relevant portions of section 123 provide as follows:

In Re: Michael McLoughlin Pharmacy Ltd. The examiner sought the High Court’s approval for a scheme of arrangement which limited his liability for negligence. The secured creditor objected as a matter of principle because such limitations of liability had become commonplace in schemes. The secured creditor made it clear that there was no suggestion of any negligence by the examiner in the particular case.

The court considered:

InDellway and Ors. v National Asset Management Agency & Ors., a number of companies and Paddy McKillen appealed a decision of the High Court in relation to the purported acquisition of €2∙1 billion in loans to the appellant companies by NAMA.

The appeal was brought on five grounds:

In Re McInerney Homes Limited

In the McInerney case, the company and the examiner sought to have schemes confirmed which would result in an immediate payment to a banking syndicate of €25 million. The banking syndicate contended that the discounted current value which they expected to recover from their security outside any schemes was €50 million.

Kerr & Ors v Conduit Enterprises Ltd

In 1997 the two directors of the company and others purchased a building and leased it to the company. Ownership of the company changed hands a number of times and, in 2008, the then new owners purported to void the lease on the basis that it had never been approved by shareholder resolution. The landlords issued proceedings seeking a declaration that the lease was valid.

The court held that:

In a series of cases the High Court has:

In January 2010 an interim examiner was appointed to Missford Limited, which operated the Residence Club, a private members club in St. Stephen’s Green.

In a written judgment on the costs and expenses of the interim examiner, the court held that the interim examiner “simply did more with the best of motives than his warrant permitted”. The court proceeded to refuse the interim examiner’s application for remuneration in respect of any work carried out in excess of his statutory powers.