The finality of sales of assets in bankruptcy is an indispensable feature of U.S. bankruptcy law, designed to maximize the value of a bankruptcy estate as expeditiously as possible for the benefit of all stakeholders. Promoting the finality of bankruptcy asset sales is the Bankruptcy Code's prohibition of reversal or modification on appeal of an order approving a sale to a good-faith purchaser unless the party challenging the sale obtains a stay pending appeal. This bar of appellate review is commonly referred to as "statutory mootness."

In yet another chapter in the tortured saga of the fallout from the failed 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") of media giant The Tribune Co. ("Tribune") in a transaction orchestrated by real-estate mogul Sam Zell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit largely upheld lower court dismissals of claims asserted by Tribune's chapter 11 liquidation trustee against various shareholders, officers, directors, employees, and financial advisors for, among other things, avoidance and recovery of fraudulent and preferential transfers, breach of fiduciary duties, and professional malpractice.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

Whether a contract is "executory" such that it can be assumed, rejected, or assigned in bankruptcy is a question infrequently addressed by the circuit courts of appeals. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provided some rare appellate court-level guidance on the question in Spyglass Media Group, LLC v. Bruce Cohen Productions (In re Weinstein Company Holdings LLC), 997 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2021).

In In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C., 2021 WL 1603608 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2021), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York addressed the interaction between purported setoff rights arising under investment agreements governed by Islamic law and the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbors protecting the exercise of non-debtors' rights under financial contracts.

Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code provides special protection for tenants if a trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") rejects an unexpired lease under which the debtor was the lessor by giving the tenant the option of retaining possession of the leased premises. Although the provision clearly describes what rights a tenant has if it makes such an election, it does not unequivocally address the extent of the electing tenant's obligations under the rejected lease or any related agreements. The U.S.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to avoid fraudulent transfers is an important tool promoting the bankruptcy policies of equality of distribution among creditors and maximizing the property included in the estate.

When an individual files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the debtor’s non-exempt assets become property of the estate that is used to pay creditors. “Property of the estate” is a defined term under the Bankruptcy Code, so a disputed question in many cases is: What assets are, in fact, available to creditors?