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The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.

To promote the finality and binding effect of confirmed chapter 11 plans, the Bankruptcy Code categorically prohibits any modification of a confirmed plan after it has been "substantially consummated." Stakeholders, however, sometimes attempt to skirt this prohibition by characterizing proposed changes to a substantially consummated chapter 11 plan as some other form of relief, such as modification of the confirmation order or a plan document, or reconsideration of the allowed amount of a claim. The U.S.

One year ago, we wrote that, unlike in 2019, when the large business bankruptcy landscape was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, the COVID-19 pandemic dominated the narrative in 2020. The pandemic may not have been responsible for every reversal of corporate fortune in 2020, but it weighed heavily on the scale, particularly for companies in the energy, retail, restaurant, entertainment, health care, travel, and hospitality industries.

In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made headlines when it ruled that creditors' state law fraudulent transfer claims arising from the 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") of Tribune Co. ("Tribune") were preempted by the safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. In that ruling, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 946 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 568 (U.S. Apr.

One year ago, we wrote that the large business bankruptcy landscape in 2019 was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, with notable exceptions for disastrous wildfires, liabilities arising from the opioid crisis, price-fixing fallout, and corporate restructuring shenanigans.

The year 2020 was a different story altogether. The headline was COVID-19.

On 30 July 2020, the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA) came into operation. The IRDA is an omnibus legislation housing all of Singapore’s insolvency and restructuring laws in one single piece of legislation.

The general framework of the IRDA has been discussed in the first article in our series of articles covering the various aspects of IRDA and can be found here.

On 30 July 2020, the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA) came into operation. The IRDA is an omnibus legislation housing all of Singapore’s insolvency and restructuring laws in one single piece of legislation.

The general framework of the IRDA has been discussed in the first article in our series of articles covering the various aspects of IRDA and can be found here.

On 30 July 2020, the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA) came into operation. The IRDA is an omnibus legislation housing all of Singapore’s insolvency and restructuring laws in one single piece of legislation.

The general framework of the IRDA has been discussed in the first article in our series of articles covering the various aspects of IRDA and can be found here.

The Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Bill was passed in the Parliament on 1 October 2018 and assented to by the President on 31 October 2018. Today, i.e. 30 July 2020, the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA) will finally come into effect. In this article, which is the first of five in a series of articles covering various aspects of IRDA, we will provide an overview of its main features.

History of Singapore’s insolvency regime