Fulltext Search

One year ago, we wrote that, unlike in 2019, when the large business bankruptcy landscape was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, the COVID-19 pandemic dominated the narrative in 2020. The pandemic may not have been responsible for every reversal of corporate fortune in 2020, but it weighed heavily on the scale, particularly for companies in the energy, retail, restaurant, entertainment, health care, travel, and hospitality industries.

In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made headlines when it ruled that creditors' state law fraudulent transfer claims arising from the 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") of Tribune Co. ("Tribune") were preempted by the safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. In that ruling, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 946 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 568 (U.S. Apr.

Insolvency practitioners and buyers of distressed assets beware: although the National Security and Investment Act 2021 (NSI Act) will come into effect in the UK on 4 January 2022, it has retrospective power to examine transactions from 12 November 2020.

Mandatory notification

Insolvency practitioners and buyers of distressed assets beware: although the National Security and Investment Act 2021 (NSI Act) will come into effect in the UK on 4 January 2022, it has retrospective power to examine transactions from 12 November 2020.

Mandatory notification

On 23 March 2021, the 2011 sale of the One Blackfriars development site in London by administrators was cleared of misfeasance by the High Court, in Re One Blackfriars Ltd [2021] EWHC 684 (Ch).

In a £250 million claim, the company's liquidators had alleged that the former administrators had breached their duties by failing to act independently of the banking syndicate which appointed them, failing to properly assess the value of the site, and selling the site at an undervalue.

Here, we recap the facts of the case and outline the key takeaways to consider.

On 23 March 2021, the 2011 sale of the One Blackfriars development site in London by administrators was cleared of misfeasance by the High Court, in Re One Blackfriars Ltd [2021] EWHC 684 (Ch).

In a £250 million claim, the company's liquidators had alleged that the former administrators had breached their duties by failing to act independently of the banking syndicate which appointed them, failing to properly assess the value of the site, and selling the site at an undervalue.

Here, we recap the facts of the case and outline the key takeaways to consider.

One year ago, we wrote that the large business bankruptcy landscape in 2019 was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, with notable exceptions for disastrous wildfires, liabilities arising from the opioid crisis, price-fixing fallout, and corporate restructuring shenanigans.

The year 2020 was a different story altogether. The headline was COVID-19.

As previously reported, the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (CIGA) had made some permanent and temporary changes to the insolvency regime.

Here we focus on the impact of CIGA on construction contracts and, in particular, how the new provisions impact on construction contracts and the Construction Act.

What is CICA?

After the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill (CIGB) was published on 20 May 2020, it raced through the House of Commons and House of Lords and, on 26 June 2020 (in under 6 weeks) came into force as the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (CIGA), with certain of the temporary measures taking effect from 1 March 2020.

How was the CIGB received?