Even if the statutory conditions for cramming down the votes of dissenting creditors has been met, the court retains a discretion to consider other factors

Certain statutory conditions need to be met in order for the court to sanction a plan at least one class of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) – referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating that dissenting creditors are no worse off under a contested restructuring plan than in the relevant alternative is an essential requirement for the court to exercise its power to sanction the plan

The power of the court to sanction a restructuring plan where one or more classes of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) is referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating what would most likely happen if a restructuring plan were not sanctioned is an essential element for the exercise of the court's discretion to cram down the votes of dissenting creditors

Restructuring plans under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) may provide an alternative for companies in financial distress to formal insolvency (see our previous Insight).

Restructuring plans can provide companies in the early stages of financial difficulty with a flexible alternative to entering a formal insolvency procedure

Under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), companies or groups encountering financial difficulties affecting their ability to carry on business can propose a compromise or arrangement (a restructuring plan) which mitigates or eliminates the effects of those financial difficulties.

The finality of asset sales and other transactions in bankruptcy is an indispensable feature of U.S. bankruptcy law designed to maximize the value of a bankruptcy estate as expeditiously as possible for the benefit of all stakeholders. To promote such finality, section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits reversal or modification on appeal of an order authorizing a sale or lease to a "good-faith" purchaser or lessee unless the party challenging the sale obtains a stay pending appeal. What constitutes "good faith" has sometimes been disputed by the courts.

Since May 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued three decisions addressing or potentially impacting issues of bankruptcy law. These included rulings concerning the abrogation of sovereign immunity for Native American tribes under the Bankruptcy Code, and for instrumentalities of Puerto Rico under a similar statute enacted in 2016 allowing the Commonwealth to restructure its debts. The Court also handed down an opinion concerning a homeowner's entitlement to the surplus proceeds of a real estate tax foreclosure sale.

Whether a dispute that is subject to arbitration can or must be referred to arbitration after one of the parties to a prepetition arbitration agreement files for bankruptcy has long been a source of disagreement among bankruptcy and appellate courts due to a perceived conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act and the Bankruptcy Code. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently provided some useful guidance regarding this issue.

To prevent "trafficking in corporate shells," the Bankruptcy Code prohibits any discharge of corporate or partnership debts if the debtor is not an "individual" and, in a chapter 11 case, if the debtor proposes a liquidating chapter 11 plan contemplating the cessation of the debtor's business following confirmation.

A bankruptcy trustee's ability to avoid and recover pre-bankruptcy preferential transfers is essential to preserving or augmenting the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. In 2019, however, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to add a due diligence requirement to the Bankruptcy Code's preference avoidance provision, apparently as a way to minimize the volume of speculative and coercive preference litigation.

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions to creditors in a "structured dismissal" of a chapter 11 case that violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules without the consent of creditors. However, because the Court declined to express any "view about the legality of structured dismissals in general," many open questions remain regarding the structured dismissal mechanism.