We have previously written about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, No. 21-441, the Supreme Court case considering the question of whether the 2018 difference in fees between Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts was consistent with the Constitution’s uniformity requirement for bankruptcy laws.

A discharge in bankruptcy usually discharges a debtor from the debtor’s liabilities. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, however, sets forth certain exceptions to this policy, including for “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to “establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” While Congress has general authority to establish a bankruptcy system, bankruptcy laws must be “uniform.” But not every aspect of the bankruptcy system is the same across every judicial district.

In an opinion that mostly flew under the radar in 2021, Judge Christopher Sontchi from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Court”) found investment firm Yucaipa American Alliance Fund I, L.P. and Yucaipa American Alliance (Parallel) Fund I, L.P.

In an opinion that mostly flew under the radar in 2021, Judge Christopher Sontchi from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Court”) found a private equity sponsor (the “Sponsor”)¹ liable (and, in some cases, not liable) under various contractual and tort theories in connection with actions the Sponsor took or did not take in its failed efforts to stave off a potential bankruptcy filing of its portfolio company, Allied Systems Holdings, Inc., now known as ASHINC Corporation (“Allied” or the “Company

The Bankruptcy Code grants the power to avoid certain transactions to a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547–48. Is there a general requirement that these avoidance powers only be used when doing so would benefit creditors? In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico addressed this question, concluding, in the face of a split of authority, that there was such a requirement.

A creditor in bankruptcy must normally file a proof of claim by a certain specified time, known as the bar date, or have its claim be barred.

In March, we reported on a brief filed by the Solicitor General recommending denial of a petition for certiorari filed by Tribune creditors seeking Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit ruling dismissing their state-law fraudulent transfer claims.

A discharge of debt in bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). Certain debts, however, including debts “for violation of . . . any of the State securities laws,” are not subject to discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). A discharge injunction does not bar the collection of such debts.

While there has been much fuss over the recent ruling by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in In re Nine West LBO Securities Litigation¹ due to its potential ramifications for director liability, as we explored in Part I of our series on this case here, court watchers have paid less attention to the court’s treatment of officer liability and the interes