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On October 7, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) vacated, as moot, two FERC orders asserting concurrent jurisdiction to review the disposition of certain Pacific Gas & Electric Corporation (“PG&E”) power purchase agreements (“PPAs”) that PG&E sought to reject through bankruptcy. In a brief memorandum decision, a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel explained that the orders had become moot when the bankruptcy court confirmed a reorganization plan that had PG&E assume, rather than reject, the PPAs.

In an important decision issued at the end of August, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re Tribune Co., Case No. 18-2909 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 2020), held that subordination agreements need not be strictly enforced when confirming a chapter 11 plan pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provision in section 1129(b)(1). In its decision, the Third Circuit also encouraged bankruptcy courts to apply “a more flexible unfair-discrimination standard” and set forth eight guiding principles to aid in that effort.

On January 27, 2020, FERC petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (“Sixth Circuit”) for rehearing en banc of that court’s decision finding bankruptcy court-FERC concurrent jurisdiction over certain power purchase agreements. Notwithstanding such concurrent jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit’s decision finds that the bankruptcy court’s concurrent jurisdiction is paramount, and that therefore, FERC-jurisdictional power purchase agreements are susceptible to rejection in bankruptcy.

In a recent decision, In re Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, L.P., No. 14-000255-mdc (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2019), the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that state sovereign immunity does not prevent bankruptcy courts from hearing fraudulent transfer claims against states.

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on an issue that has greatly divided Circuit Courts of Appeal – the question of whether an entity that retains possession of a debtor’s property has an affirmative obligation to return that property to the debtor or trustee immediately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition or risk being in violation of the automatic stay.

The Supreme Court, in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC,1 issued an unanimous opinion last week, ruling that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit correctly denied the ability of creditor Ritzen Group Inc.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court case that held that the mutuality requirement of section 553(a)1The case declined to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.2

A recent bankruptcy court decision out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, In re Verity Health Sys. of Cal., Inc., Case No. 2:18-bk-20151 (ER) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019), is a good reminder of how difficult it is for a purchaser under an asset purchase agreement to get out of the deal by invoking a Material Adverse Effect clause (also known as a Material Adverse Change clause) (an “MAE”).