On 23 April 2020 the UK Government announced that they will be introducing a temporary ban on the use of statutory demands and winding up petitions where the inability to pay has arisen because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

On 28 March 2020 the Secretary of State for BEIS, Alok Sharma, announced that changes would be made to the UK insolvency laws to help companies "…emerge intact the other side of the COVID-19 pandemic…to give them extra time and space to weather the storm and be ready when the crisis ends whilst ensuring creditors get the best returns possible in the circumstances".

In a recent decision, In re Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, L.P., No. 14-000255-mdc (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2019), the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that state sovereign immunity does not prevent bankruptcy courts from hearing fraudulent transfer claims against states.

On January 13, 2020, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued an opinion in In re La Paloma Generating Company, LLC., Case No. 16-12700 [Adv. Pro.

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on an issue that has greatly divided Circuit Courts of Appeal – the question of whether an entity that retains possession of a debtor’s property has an affirmative obligation to return that property to the debtor or trustee immediately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition or risk being in violation of the automatic stay.

The Supreme Court, in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC,¹ issued an unanimous opinion last week, ruling that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit correctly denied the ability of creditor Ritzen Group Inc.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court case that held that the mutuality requirement of section 553(a)¹The case declined to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.²

A recent bankruptcy court decision out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, In re Verity Health Sys. of Cal., Inc., Case No. 2:18-bk-20151 (ER) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019), is a good reminder of how difficult it is for a purchaser under an asset purchase agreement to get out of the deal by invoking a Material Adverse Effect clause (also known as a Material Adverse Change clause) (an “MAE”).

In a highly anticipated decision issued last Thursday (on December 19, 2019), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC that a bankruptcy court may constitutionally confirm a chapter 11 plan of reorganization that contains nonconsensual third-party releases. The court considered whether, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), Article III of the United States Constitution prohibits a bankruptcy court from granting such releases.

On 19 September 2019, Norris J handed downjudgment in the challenge brought by six landlords against the Debenhams Retail Limited (Debenhams) company voluntary arrangement (CVA) which was approved by 94.71% of Debenham’s unsecured creditors on 9 May 2019.