OVERVIEW

Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVAs) are an insolvency procedure established under the Insolvency Act 1986 which allow a struggling company to reach a compromise on debts due with a sufficient majority of creditors, thereby avoiding a formal insolvency. They have primarily been used only by large high street retailers and are not often considered, particularly in Scotland, a realistic option for small and medium companies (SMEs).

In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic and with a new model available, we believe it is time for a rethink.

In an important decision issued at the end of August, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re Tribune Co., Case No. 18-2909 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 2020), held that subordination agreements need not be strictly enforced when confirming a chapter 11 plan pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provision in section 1129(b)(1). In its decision, the Third Circuit also encouraged bankruptcy courts to apply “a more flexible unfair-discrimination standard” and set forth eight guiding principles to aid in that effort.

THE LANDLORD'S POSITION' TO CVAs v PRE-PACKS

There has been much press coverage in recent years on Tenant CVAs and the tempo on these has increased in recent weeks with the approval of CVAs for New Look, Pizza Express and Yo Sushi! amongst others.

In a recent decision, In re Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, L.P., No. 14-000255-mdc (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2019), the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that state sovereign immunity does not prevent bankruptcy courts from hearing fraudulent transfer claims against states.

On January 13, 2020, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued an opinion in In re La Paloma Generating Company, LLC., Case No. 16-12700 [Adv. Pro.

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on an issue that has greatly divided Circuit Courts of Appeal – the question of whether an entity that retains possession of a debtor’s property has an affirmative obligation to return that property to the debtor or trustee immediately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition or risk being in violation of the automatic stay.

The Supreme Court, in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC,¹ issued an unanimous opinion last week, ruling that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit correctly denied the ability of creditor Ritzen Group Inc.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court case that held that the mutuality requirement of section 553(a)¹The case declined to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.²

A recent bankruptcy court decision out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, In re Verity Health Sys. of Cal., Inc., Case No. 2:18-bk-20151 (ER) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019), is a good reminder of how difficult it is for a purchaser under an asset purchase agreement to get out of the deal by invoking a Material Adverse Effect clause (also known as a Material Adverse Change clause) (an “MAE”).