This author—whose practice is heavily weighted toward representation of official committees in large chapter 11 cases—has previously penned articles relating to questions surrounding the permanency of an official committee.

The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.

In a scholarly, comprehensive and lengthy opinion written by one of the Southern District of New York’s most recently appointed Bankruptcy Judges, the issue of whether the reinstatement of defaulted and accelerated debt requires the payment of default-rate interest and fees was answered in the affirmative, undoubtedly to the delight of lenders everywhere.

Last November we wrote about the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Highland Capital Management, L.P., where the court reversed the bankruptcy court’s approval of a plan’s exculpation clause for non-debtors and limited the universe of parties covered by that provision. Relying on Bank of New York Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm.

While the Judge-made doctrine of equitable mootness continues to beguile and often stymie parties-in-interest seeking to appeal an order confirming a chapter 11 plan (as well as other orders which are on appeal prior to confirmation of a plan), appellants in the Fifth Circuit can continue to rest assured that the doctrine will be applied only as a “scalpel rather than an axe.” That is because in the Fifth Circuit, the doctrine—which can be described as a form of appellate abstention—is applied only on a claim-by-claim, instead of appeal-by-appeal basis.

To promote the finality and binding effect of confirmed chapter 11 plans, the Bankruptcy Code categorically prohibits any modification of a confirmed plan after it has been "substantially consummated." Stakeholders, however, sometimes attempt to skirt this prohibition by characterizing proposed changes to a substantially consummated chapter 11 plan as some other form of relief, such as modification of the confirmation order or a plan document, or reconsideration of the allowed amount of a claim. The U.S.

Last week this author delved into what has become known as the “Texas Two-Step,” the arguments for and against its permissibility and the broader implications for the bankruptcy system.

In recent weeks, a move dubbed the “Texas Two-Step” has leaped from coverage first in publications geared only for the professional restructuring community, then to the mainstream press, then to hearings before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, and now to a full-blown trial ongoing in a New Jersey bankruptcy court.

One year ago, we wrote that, unlike in 2019, when the large business bankruptcy landscape was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, the COVID-19 pandemic dominated the narrative in 2020. The pandemic may not have been responsible for every reversal of corporate fortune in 2020, but it weighed heavily on the scale, particularly for companies in the energy, retail, restaurant, entertainment, health care, travel, and hospitality industries.

In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made headlines when it ruled that creditors' state law fraudulent transfer claims arising from the 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") of Tribune Co. ("Tribune") were preempted by the safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. In that ruling, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 946 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 568 (U.S. Apr.