Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

This author—whose practice is heavily weighted toward representation of official committees in large chapter 11 cases—has previously penned articles relating to questions surrounding the permanency of an official committee.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

In a scholarly, comprehensive and lengthy opinion written by one of the Southern District of New York’s most recently appointed Bankruptcy Judges, the issue of whether the reinstatement of defaulted and accelerated debt requires the payment of default-rate interest and fees was answered in the affirmative, undoubtedly to the delight of lenders everywhere.

Last November we wrote about the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Highland Capital Management, L.P., where the court reversed the bankruptcy court’s approval of a plan’s exculpation clause for non-debtors and limited the universe of parties covered by that provision. Relying on Bank of New York Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm.

While the Judge-made doctrine of equitable mootness continues to beguile and often stymie parties-in-interest seeking to appeal an order confirming a chapter 11 plan (as well as other orders which are on appeal prior to confirmation of a plan), appellants in the Fifth Circuit can continue to rest assured that the doctrine will be applied only as a “scalpel rather than an axe.” That is because in the Fifth Circuit, the doctrine—which can be described as a form of appellate abstention—is applied only on a claim-by-claim, instead of appeal-by-appeal basis.

Directors resign for many reasons. For example, there may be disagreements among stakeholders about the future course of the company, they may be concerned about the risks associated with financial difficulty/insolvency, or they may just wish to retire.

Last week this author delved into what has become known as the “Texas Two-Step,” the arguments for and against its permissibility and the broader implications for the bankruptcy system.

This is one of a series of articles we at Morton Fraser are producing to guide our clients through the wholesale change proposed in Scots law in relation to security over goods, intellectual property and shares, on the one hand, and invoice finance or the purchase of receivables, on the other. For a general introduction to what the Bill covers, see here.

In recent weeks, a move dubbed the “Texas Two-Step” has leaped from coverage first in publications geared only for the professional restructuring community, then to the mainstream press, then to hearings before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, and now to a full-blown trial ongoing in a New Jersey bankruptcy court.