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Last month, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Baker Botts LLP v. Asarco LLC. As most readers will be aware, that case involved a dispute over whether debtor’s retained counsel could be compensated for the fees and expenses incurred in the defense of its bankruptcy fee application.

People are generally familiar with the concept that a party’s right to appeal applies to those orders that are “final.” A “final” order is one that resolves or disposes of the disputes between the parties. While an interlocutory order may be appealable at the discretion of the appellate court, the aggrieved party has no absolute right to appeal an order that is not “final.”

Most bankruptcy lawyers are familiar with section 1111(b) and its attempt to rectify a perceived unfairness resulting from the ruling in In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., Case No. B75-4345A, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17366 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 1976). In Pinegate, the creditor’s collateral had depreciated as the result of a cyclical market fluctuation.

What began as a garden variety bankruptcy claims objection has ended with a sharply-worded, sixty-page opinion, in which the Sixth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ( “BAP”) affirmed a bankruptcy court’s $200,000 sanctions order entered against the creditor’s attorney.

“Bad news comes in threes.” “Third time’s the charm.” “Three strikes and you’re out.”

One of these three adages may come to characterize the outcome of a case of significant import argued before the US Supreme Court this week. The Supreme Court heard arguments on Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif. The case is the third in a trilogy including Stern v. Marshall and Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, which examine the scope of the constitutional exercise of judicial power by bankruptcy courts.

Under section 365(f)(1), a debtor is permitted to assume and assign leases and executory contracts notwithstanding contractual limitations or “applicable law” that restricts such assignment. However, that broad general authorization begins with the limiting language, “except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) of this section….”

In ordinary civil litigation, appellate review is generally limited to “final judgments,” in order to prevent the wastefulness of appeals on rulings that are not truly dispositive of the case. That notion becomes somewhat more difficult in a bankruptcy, where there are often multiple litigations within the umbrella bankruptcy case. But does that mean that notions of finality should be different in the bankruptcy context? Not so, at least according to the Sixth Circuit.

Most lawyers are generally familiar with the concept of a floating lien under the Uniform Commercial Code. A secured creditor takes a lien in a collateral category that changes from time to time as items are added or subtracted. A common example is a working capital loan, in which financed inventory is produced and sold, then becoming an account, which is collected to provide the funds to produce new inventory.  A secured creditor may perfect a lien in the changing mass of inventory and receivables, as each category exists from time to time.

In September 2012, Grant Thornton were appointed by the Royal Court of Guernsey as joint administrators of a Guernsey company called Montenegro investments limited (MIL) - a Guernsey property Investment Fund..  The joint administrators then appointed Ogier.

Current Status of MIL

This client briefing provides a general overview of schemes of arrangement for Guernsey companies under the Companies (Guernsey) Law, 2008 (the Companies Law).  A scheme of arrangement can involve almost any kind of corporate reorganisation, merger, acquisition or restructuring so long as the appropriate approvals and court sanction are obtained. In the context of restructurings, there is limited precedent in Guernsey, although such schemes of arrangement can be used to assist in insolvent/quasi-insolvent restructurings.