Last June, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in Baker Botts LLP v.

The General Motors chapter 11 case continues to produce interesting decisions on a variety of bankruptcy issues. Most recently, the bankruptcy court issued an opinion on the liability of “New GM” for alleged ignition switch defects, many of which involve vehicles manufactured by “Old GM” prior to the bankruptcy filing.

When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Baker & Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC in June, it caused something of a flutter in the bankruptcy community. The decision held that a professional could not recover for the fees it incurred in defending against objections to its fee application.

The Supreme Court has held that a floating charge, crystallised by notice, prior to the commencement of a winding up, ranks ahead of preferential creditors. However, the Court expressed the view that the relevant legislation needs to be amended to reverse the “undoubtedly unsatisfactory outcome”.

Background

Last month, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Baker Botts LLP v. Asarco LLC. As most readers will be aware, that case involved a dispute over whether debtor’s retained counsel could be compensated for the fees and expenses incurred in the defense of its bankruptcy fee application.

On 13 May 2015, the Government announced that it intends to give the courts the power to overrule the rejection by secured creditors of arrangements under the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 (the “Act”).

There is scant detail in the announcement save that it is intended to “support mortgage holders who are in arrears” and that legislation is to be brought forward before the Summer recess. How is such legislation likely to work and what potential frailties could it have?

The Issue

People are generally familiar with the concept that a party’s right to appeal applies to those orders that are “final.” A “final” order is one that resolves or disposes of the disputes between the parties. While an interlocutory order may be appealable at the discretion of the appellate court, the aggrieved party has no absolute right to appeal an order that is not “final.”

Most bankruptcy lawyers are familiar with section 1111(b) and its attempt to rectify a perceived unfairness resulting from the ruling in In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., Case No. B75-4345A, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17366 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 1976). In Pinegate, the creditor’s collateral had depreciated as the result of a cyclical market fluctuation.

What began as a garden variety bankruptcy claims objection has ended with a sharply-worded, sixty-page opinion, in which the Sixth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ( “BAP”) affirmed a bankruptcy court’s $200,000 sanctions order entered against the creditor’s attorney.

“Bad news comes in threes.” “Third time’s the charm.” “Three strikes and you’re out.”

One of these three adages may come to characterize the outcome of a case of significant import argued before the US Supreme Court this week. The Supreme Court heard arguments on Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif. The case is the third in a trilogy including Stern v. Marshall and Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, which examine the scope of the constitutional exercise of judicial power by bankruptcy courts.