Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

In my most recent blog post, I provided some tips for creditors who find themselves in the Subchapter V arena. This is somewhat of a follow-up to that one.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

The overwhelming majority of my practice has involved larger, complex Chapter 11 cases and out-of-court restructurings, and representing debtors, Chapter 11 trustees, committees or creditors.

When Subchapter V came to be in 2019 under the Small Business Reorganization Act, I honestly did not think that I would have the opportunity to participate in those types of cases due to the debt limitations imposed by statute.

The overwhelming majority of my practice has involved larger, complex Chapter 11 cases and out-of-court restructurings, representing debtors, Chapter 11 trustees, committees, or creditors. However, with the expansion during Covid of the Subchapter V debt limit to $7.5 million, I have found myself participating in multiple Subchapter V cases as counsel to creditors. I discovered quickly that habits developed in larger Chapter 11 cases do not necessarily translate to Subchapter V.

When a debtor receives a bankruptcy discharge, section 524(a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code prohibits a creditor from seeking to collect a prepetition debt against the discharged debtor or its property. Importantly, the discharge does not extinguish the debt—it merely limits recourse against the discharged debtor. Section 524(e), however, provides that the discharge does not affect the liability of non-debtors for the discharged debt.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background

When an individual files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the debtor’s non-exempt assets become property of the estate that is used to pay creditors. “Property of the estate” is a defined term under the Bankruptcy Code, so a disputed question in many cases is: What assets are, in fact, available to creditors?