Every so often, we post an article on case law discussing proofs of claim. The decisions often contain basic but important information about the timing and manner of claim filing.

In sophisticated real estate financing transactions, most prudent lenders attempt to deter borrowers from filing for bankruptcy before loans are paid in full by providing in loan documents that such a filing constitutes an event of default. Many lenders will insist that their borrowers remain “bankruptcy remote” in the form of a so-called “single asset real estate” entity during the term of the loan.

In the third (and final) of our blog series on recent CVA cases, in Rhino Enterprises Properties Ltd & Anor [2020] EWHC 2370 (Ch), the High Court gave permission for misfeasance proceedings to be brought against two former joint administrators. This was despite an approved Company Voluntary Arrangement (“CVA”) containing a clause releasing the joint administrators from liability.

Increasing pressures placed on those operating in the retail and hospitality sectors as a result of COVID-19, means there is likely to be an increasing use of CVAs in these sectors. The intention would be to help support and restructure businesses in distress, but could retailers use a CVA as a mechanism to re-write the terms of its leases?

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the problems faced by high-street retailers. Store closures during lockdown, changing consumer behaviour and the resultant loss of turnover and profits have caused many businesses to seek to reduce their rent payments. Company Voluntary Arrangements (“CVAs”) have become fashionable tools for trying to secure such rent reductions.

On 26 November 2020, The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (Coronavirus) (Suspension of Liability for Wrongful Trading and Extension of the Relevant Period) Regulations 2020 (the “Regulations”) came into force.

The Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. These avoidance powers are subject to certain limitations, including a safe harbor in section 546(e) exempting certain transfers. Among other things, section 546(e) bars avoidance of a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . .

There are several ways in which property owners can advantageously use the Bankruptcy Code to effectuate strategic dispositions of assets. But the bankruptcy process can be fraught with uncertainty that can upend the best laid plans. The matter of In re Wansdown Properties Corp. N.V., No. 19-13223 (SMB), 2020 WL 5887542 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020) provides an instructive and cautionary example.

Last February, we blogged about the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp, No. 19-1430, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4947 (Feb. 18, 2020). The Third Circuit approved a process for resolving asbestos claims in which a bar date was imposed on filing the claims, but late claimants who were unaware of their asbestos claims would be allowed to have the bar date excused through Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3). (A bar date is a date set by the court by which all claims against the debtor must be filed.

This post concerns computation of time under Bankruptcy Rule 9006. The specific issue addressed is whether a bankruptcy court — when computing a filing deadline — should count a day when its clerk’s office is closed, even if the electronic filing system is available. In a recent case, a federal district judge explained why in his view the day shouldn’t be counted. Labbadia v. Martin (In re Martin), No. 3:20-cv-939, 2020 WL 5300932, (SRU) (D. Conn. Sept. 4, 2020).