In spring 2020, the Czech Republic, like the rest of the world, was severely affected by the coronavirus pandemic. The spread of COVID-19 outbreaks led to drastic shutdowns and reduced operations in almost all sectors of the economy. The loss of income and suspension of payments threatened to lead to the insolvency of thousands of businesses. So in spring 2020 the Czech Parliament approved temporary statutory measures to prevent the collapse of the business sector due to formal insolvency proceedings (the so-called Lex COVID).

Lockdown, shutdowns, drops in revenue and related negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic faced by companies even still operating and in a healthy state have prompted the Czech government to respond to this situation and implement statutory measures to mitigate such impacts (the so-called LEX COVID), also in the area of insolvency. Most of such measures are only temporary during the extraordinary measures taken by public authorities during the COVID-19 pandemic. LEX COVID, which brings the below-mentioned changes, has already been enacted and came into force on 24 April 2020.

In In re KB Toys,¹ a recent decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court held that a claim that is disallowable under § 502(d)² if held by the original claimant is also disallowable in the hands of a purchaser or subsequent transferee. In other words, if a creditor sells or assigns its claim to a claims trader and the creditor later becomes liable on a preference or fraudulent transfer,³ the claim may be disallowed in the hands of the claims trader if the creditor fails to pay the amount it owes to the estate.

Bankruptcy Judge Michael Lynn of the Northern District of Texas recently issued a noteworthy opinion in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. that addresses two important Chapter 11 confirmation issues. Judge Lynn determined that a plan that artificially impaired a class of claims in order to meet the requirements of section 1129(a)(10) had not been proposed in bad faith and did not violate the requirements of section 1129(a). In his ruling, Judge Lynn also applied the Supreme Court’s cram-down “interest”1 rate teachings in Till v.