Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

To start, let me introduce some familiar characters. First, an impecunious claimant who has the benefit of after the event (ATE) insurance, but the disadvantage of an incompetent solicitor. Second, a successful defendant with the benefit of a costs order and a final costs certificate, but the disadvantage of a slippery ATE insurer who has avoided the claimant’s ATE policy because of failures by the aforesaid incompetent solicitor. Different ways around this problem have been tried, and generally failed.

The serious consequences of an adjudication of bankruptcy against an individual has long justified the strict requirement that bankruptcy petitions be personally served. Rule 6.14 of the Insolvency Rules 1986 requires as much, and says that ‘service shall be effected by delivering to [the debtor] a sealed copy of the petition’. But what constitutes delivery where the debtor declines to accept the petition from the process server?