Section 154 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) provides that a business rescue plan (BR plan) may provide that a creditor, who has acceded to the discharge of the whole or part of a debt owing to that creditor, will lose the right to enforce the debt or part of it. Furthermore, if a BR plan has been approved and implemented, a creditor is not entitled to enforce any debt owed by the company immediately before the beginning of the business rescue process, except to the extent provided for in the BR plan.
Since the inception of business rescue, misconduct by business rescue practitioners (BRPs) has been one of the biggest causes of complaint (and headaches) by creditors. More and more disgruntled creditors and other affected persons are pursuing the removal of rogue BRPs of companies in business rescue.
In terms of section 139 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, a BRP may only be removed from office in terms of section 130, or as provided for in section 139. Furthermore, only the court is authorised to remove a BRP from office, both in terms of sections 130 and 139.
Section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides for a general moratorium on legal proceedings against a company in business rescue.
I wrote an article published in the June issue of Without Prejudice in which this question was considered. I criticised the then binding judgment of Chetty t/a Nationwide Electrical v Hart NO and Another (12559/2012) [20141 ZAKZDHC 9 (25 March 2014), as it was held in that case that arbitration proceedings do not constitute legal proceedings for purposes of section 133 of the Act.
Can a creditor cancel an agreement with a company in business rescue and what is the consequence of a business rescue practitioner suspending an agreement before cancellation?
The lawfulness of cancelling a contract during business rescue
The advent of the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) brought with it a shift from a creditor-protectionist society towards a business rescue model that is debtor-protectionist. In consequence, there has been a swarm of applications taking advantage and exploiting this new scheme. This shift has unfortunately led to considerable abuse of the business rescue procedure.
There has been considerable controversy about the extent of the powers, and the extent of obligations of a business rescue practitioner in relation to a cession of book debts by the company in rescue.
This is an important issue in business rescue because most financially distressed companies have an overdraft facility with a bank which is secured by a cession of debtors. Many practitioners want or need to use the overdraft facility as working capital.
Cession (generally)
Can a creditor cancel an agreement with a company in business rescue and what is the consequence of a business rescue practitioner suspending an agreement before cancellation?
The lawfulness of cancelling a contract during business rescue
The advent of the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) brought with it a shift from a creditor-protectionist society towards a business rescue model that is debtor-protectionist. In consequence, there has been a swarm of applications taking advantage and exploiting this new scheme. This shift has unfortunately led to considerable abuse of the business rescue procedure.
Since the inception of business rescue, misconduct by business rescue practitioners (BRPs) has been one of the biggest causes of complaint (and headaches) by creditors. More and more disgruntled creditors and other affected persons are pursuing the removal of rogue BRPs of companies in business rescue.
In terms of section 139 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, a BRP may only be removed from office in terms of section 130, or as provided for in section 139. Furthermore, only the court is authorised to remove a BRP from office, both in terms of sections 130 and 139.
Section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides for a general moratorium on legal proceedings against a company in business rescue.
I wrote an article published in the June issue of Without Prejudice in which this question was considered. I criticised the then binding judgment of Chetty t/a Nationwide Electrical v Hart NO and Another (12559/2012) [20141 ZAKZDHC 9 (25 March 2014), as it was held in that case that arbitration proceedings do not constitute legal proceedings for purposes of section 133 of the Act.