BBA has published a briefing paper setting out its position on the Commission’s proposal for a bank recovery and resolution directive. It suggests that certain powers, such as appointing a Special Manager or requiring a plan for debt restructuring, are more akin to resolution tools and should not be used until the firm has reached its point of non-viability. This also applies to the bail-in tool, which cannot be used as the first or default option.
FMLC has published an addendum to its March 2012 paper on legal uncertainties arising from bail-ins. The addendum addresses the points the Commission made in a recent paper. (Source: FMLC Bail-in Addendum)
The UK Treasury and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) have been drip-feeding the industry rules and practical details of the transfer of consumer credit (CC) regulation to FCA. FCA has now published the final form of its detailed rules in its Consumer Credit Sourcebook (CONC), with feedback and practical advice. The rules apply from 1 April 2014 with limited grace periods only. It is critical that all firms carrying on credit-related regulated activities know what the changes mean for them.
FRC has issued guidance to banks' directors on financial reporting of solvency and liquidity risks, and the definition of going concern, in the context of post-crisis reforms and central bank and government support. (Source: Guidance for Directors of Banks)
The Government has decided to create a Special Administration Regime (SAR) for systemically important payment and securities settlement systems. It is concerned that, were one of these market infrastructures to become insolvent, the administrator or liquidator would have to work towards maximising value for creditors, rather than keeping critical payment and settlement services running. The Bank of England would have the power to apply to court for an order declaring the start of SAR proceedings. Ensuring continuity of service would be among the special administrator’s objectives.
The Government has fed back on the responses to DBIS’s consultation on the effect of bankruptcy on the ability to access a basic bank account. Responses to the consultation have shown that only 27% of people subject to a bankruptcy order are able to retain their bank account. A bank's decision not to offer a bank account to a bankrupt is mainly based on the bankrupt's credit record, rather than on the risk of the trustee making a claim against the bank, a risk that the consultation process has shown is more perceived than real.
FRC has issued guidance to banks' directors on financial reporting of solvency and liquidity risks, and the definition of going concern, in the context of post-crisis reforms and central bank and government support. (Source: Guidance for Directors of Banks)
The Government has decided to create a Special Administration Regime (SAR) for systemically important payment and securities settlement systems. It is concerned that, were one of these market infrastructures to become insolvent, the administrator or liquidator would have to work towards maximising value for creditors, rather than keeping critical payment and settlement services running. The Bank of England would have the power to apply to court for an order declaring the start of SAR proceedings. Ensuring continuity of service would be among the special administrator’s objectives.
The Government has fed back on the responses to DBIS’s consultation on the effect of bankruptcy on the ability to access a basic bank account. Responses to the consultation have shown that only 27% of people subject to a bankruptcy order are able to retain their bank account. A bank's decision not to offer a bank account to a bankrupt is mainly based on the bankrupt's credit record, rather than on the risk of the trustee making a claim against the bank, a risk that the consultation process has shown is more perceived than real.
BBA has published a briefing paper setting out its position on the Commission’s proposal for a bank recovery and resolution directive. It suggests that certain powers, such as appointing a Special Manager or requiring a plan for debt restructuring, are more akin to resolution tools and should not be used until the firm has reached its point of non-viability. This also applies to the bail-in tool, which cannot be used as the first or default option.