The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,1 Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.
Bankruptcy Judge Christopher S. Sontchi recently ruled in the Energy Future Holdings case1 that the debtor will not be required to pay the $431 million “make whole” demanded by bondholders upon the debtor’s early payment of the bonds.2
The latest turn in the ongoing Petters bankruptcy saga came on June 11, when U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Gregory Kishel issued a 46-page order examining 2012 amendments to the Minnesota Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (MUFTA).
The U.S. Supreme Court has issued its opinion in Baker Botts v. Asarco, holding that professionals retained in bankruptcy cases cannot receive compensation for the costs of defending their fee applications. Even if you aren’t a bankruptcy professional, there are two things to keep in mind about this opinion. First, it won’t stop us restructuring professionals from doing our jobs. Second, the reality of commercial bankruptcy practice is often at odds with the pure textual analysis favored by the Supreme Court.
On Monday, June 1, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion in Bank of America v.
In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.
Those words are from Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in the recent decision by the Supreme Court in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, which decision has generated significant press coverage (and blog postings) among bankruptcy practitioners across the country. This author certainly doesn’t intend to add to the noise out there by reciting the facts and procedural history of the case yet again.
On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”1 where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.
In In re Filene’s Basement, LLC,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware considered the rejection damages a landlord claimant was entitled to pursuant to Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code after the debtor rejected its lease as part of its reorganization plan.