The appointment of an independent director is a powerful tool for private credit lenders. The appointment is designed to introduce a voice of neutrality and fairness into the board’s decision-making process with the hope and expectation that independence from the controlling shareholder enables the board to drive toward viable value-maximizing strategies. Often times, the independent director is vested with exclusive authority (or veto rights) over a range of significant corporate decisions, including a sale, restructuring and the decision to file a bankruptcy case.

In our prior alert over the summer, we highlighted the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Stream TV Networks, Inc. v. SeeCubic, Inc., 279 A.3d 323, 329 (Del.

Restructurings defy a one-size fits all approach because every deal is unique and different tools are required to solve different problems. At one end of the restructuring continuum is the so-called “amend and extend,” where the credit agreement is amended to provide incremental liquidity, extend near-term maturities, modify covenants or some combination of the foregoing. This approach is fast and cost-efficient, but limited in its impact. At the other end of the spectrum is a restructuring through chapter 11.

Removal of requirement for sanction

Previously under section 165 IA 86, liquidators in a voluntary winding up would have to seek sanction of the company (in members’ voluntary liquidation) or of the court or liquidation committee (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) in order to exercise their powers to pay debts, compromise claims etc. SBEEA removes this requirement so that liquidators can exercise those powers freely. This will aid expeditious winding up of companies. Equivalent provisions have also been put into place for trustees in bankruptcy.