Recently, in In re Moon Group Inc., a bankruptcy court said no, but the district court, which has agreed to review the decision on an interlocutory appeal, seems far less sure.

A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals, Sutton v. Pilevsky held that federal bankruptcy law does not preempt state law tortious interference claims against non-debtors who participated in a scheme that caused a debtor—in this case a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity—to breach contractual obligations intended to ensure that the entity remains a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) and to facilitate the lenders’ enforcement of remedies upon a future bankruptcy filing, if any.

A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals, Sutton v. Pilevsky held that federal bankruptcy law does not preempt state law tortious interference claims against non-debtors who participated in a scheme that caused a debtor—in this case a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity—to breach contractual obligations intended to ensure that the entity remains a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) and to facilitate the lenders’ enforcement of remedies upon a future bankruptcy filing, if any.

On September 29, 2020, the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary advanced a Democrat-backed bill to the full chamber that seeks to address perceived shortcomings in the Bankruptcy Code’s protections for employee and retiree benefits and to curtail the use of bonuses and special compensation arrangements for executives in bankruptcy cases.

Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).

INTRODUCTION 

The Supreme Court has recently in its judgment dated 21 January 2020, in the case of Standard Chartered Bank v MSTC Limited [SLP (C) No 20093 of 2019], provided clarity on the interplay between the provisions of Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act 1993 (RDB Act) and Limitation Act 1963 (Limitation Act). Supreme Court has in doing so refused to condone a delay of 28 days in filing of a review application by the government borrower entity against a decree in favour of the bank.  

BRIEF BACKGROUND: 

The Supreme Court in its recent decision in K Kishan v M/s Vijay Nirman Company Private Limited, Civil Appeal No 21825 of 2017, has put to rest the question of whether an arbitral award that has been challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act) by the award debtor can form the basis for an action under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code).