Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.
The High Court recently issued its ruling in the matter of Re Avanti Communications Limited (in administration). It is the first major case since the pivotal 2005 House of Lords decision of Re Spectrum Plus to examine the characteristics of fixed and floating charges.
Key points
In the current times of financial stress, a borrower seeking to renegotiate or refinance existing financing arrangements may be asked by its lender to enhance or refresh its security package through the grant of a new floating charge.
The question of whether a floating charge can be avoided due to section 245 of the Insolvency Act 1986 ("IA 1986") can arise in such a context.
Void floating charges under section 245 of the IA 1986
The issue
A "no action" clause will appear in almost all English law-governed bond trust deeds.
A no action clause provides that a bondholder (or anyone entitled to payments on the bonds) cannot, initially, proceed directly against the issuer. Instead, the right to bring a cause of action resides with the trustee and it is only if the trustee, having become bound to take action, fails to do so within a reasonable time (with the failure continuing) that a bondholder can then itself proceed directly against the issuer.
The High Court has, for the first time since the introduction of the legislation in June 2020, refused to sanction a cross-class cram-down restructuring plan under Part 26A of the Companies Act. In In the matter of Hurricane Energy Plc [2021] EWHC 1759 (Ch), the court rejected a plan supported by bondholders because it had not been shown that the opposing shareholders had no better alternative prospects (i.e., the ‘no worse off condition’ had not been met).
In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.
In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina
Introduction
Towards the end of 2020, while businesses were reeling from the challenges of grappling with a global pandemic, the end of the Brexit transition period and LIBOR transition, the Law Commission published a paper analysing the current law underlying intermediated securities - Intermediated securities: who owns your shares? A Scoping Paper.
It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .