The New York State Legislature recently proposed a bill, entitled the Sovereign Debt Stability Act, [1] intended to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring.

Over the past several years, unitranche facilities have become increasingly prevalent. This growth has been driven by the ever-growing class of private credit and direct lenders who initially developed the unitranche facility structure, along with traditional bank lenders now joining this market. The unitranche structure has several advantages, including typically quicker execution for the parties involved and in some cases a lower cost of capital to the borrower.

Secured lenders are troubled at the recent news that a New York state court judge denied a preliminary injunction request filed in the Supreme Court of New York by a group of dissenting first-lien lenders, seeking to prevent a borrower, Serta Simmons, and certain first-lien consenting lenders from entering into a recapitalization transaction. In exchange for the purchase of the consenting lenders’ debt at a discount, the consenting lenders received new super-priority debt ranking ahead of the non-consenting lenders’ debt.

Key Takeaways:

Accept an unpalatable offer, or reject it and risk getting much less (or even nothing)? This is the choice stakeholders in chapter 11 bankruptcies increasingly face as a result of the proliferation of “deathtrap” provisions in plans of reorganization. For example, a class of bondholders may be forced to decide between accepting 60 cents on the dollar if they vote to accept a plan, or 40 cents if they reject. A class of equityholders may have to decide between accepting equity warrants, or rejecting and getting nothing.