The High Court of Australia’s decision in Wells Fargo Trust Company, National Association (as Owner Trustee) & Anor v VB Leaseco Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) & Ors (the “Willis” case).

On Wednesday, 16 March 2022, the High Court of Australia handed down its decision in the Willis case.

This week’s TGIF considers a recent case where the Supreme Court of Queensland rejected a director’s application to access an executory contract of sale entered into by receivers and managers on the basis it was not a ‘financial record’

Key Takeaways

This week’s TGIF looks at the decision of the Federal Court of Australia in Donoghue v Russells (A Firm)[2021] FCA 798 in which Mr Donoghue appealed a decision to make a sequestration order which was premised on him ‘carrying on business in Australia' for the purpose of section 43(1)(b)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act).

Key Takeaways

This week’s TGIF considers an application to the Federal Court for the private hearing of a public examination where separate criminal proceedings were also on foot.

Key takeaways

This week’s TGIF looks at a recent decision of the Victorian Supreme Court, where a winding up application was adjourned to allow the debtor company to pursue restructuring under the recently introduced small business restructuring reforms.

Key takeaways

Background

Following our previous alert here on Justice Middleton’s decision in Wells Fargo Trust Company, National Association (trustee) v VB Leaseco Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed),[1] the administra

On 14 May 2015, Australia acceded to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (“Cape Town Convention”) and the Protocol to the Cape Town Convention (“Cape Town Protocol”). In particular, for insolvency related proceedings, Australia adopted what is known as “Alternative A” in aviation industry speak. The Cape Town Convention became effective as Australian law on 1 September 2015 and applies to the relevant aviation leasing and financing transitions entered into after that date.

La Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo 710/2019, de 8 de marzo, resuelve en casación, por primera vez, creo, el extremo relativo a la oponibilidad al concurso de una condición resolutoria acompañada de una cláusula penal de retención de la totalidad del precio ya pagado por el comprador inmobiliario insolvente. Según la Sala, la condición resolutoria (inmobiliaria) es plenamente oponible al concurso; en este caso se hallaba inscrita, pero no parece que esta condición haya sido relevante para su efectividad.

Interesante Resolución de la Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado de 5 junio 2019. En el origen, se trata de la inscripción de una venta directa de bien hipotecado, hecha en liquidación concursal, por un valor inferior al de tasación, pero sin contar con el consentimiento del acreedor hipotecario, como impone el artículo 155.4 de la Ley Concursal (LCon). Según la administración concursal, este consentimiento no es preciso, pues en virtud del artículo 97 ha desaparecido el crédito hipotecario por no estar incluido en la lista ni haber sido ésta objeto de impugnación.