Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
We recently blogged (here) about the Privy Council decision of Sian Participation Corporation (In Liquidation) v Halimeda InternationalLtd [2024] UKPC 16 (
Can a creditor obtain a winding up order against a debtor company if the underlying dispute over the debt is subject to an arbitration agreement between the parties?
Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.
In a welcome clarification for administrators, the UK Supreme Court in the recent case of R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates’ Court[1], held that an administrator appointed under the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) is not an “officer” of the company for the purposes of section 194(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA).
Where a winding up petition is based on a debt arising from a contract with a non-Hong Kong exclusive jurisdiction clause, the court will tend to dismiss or stay the winding up petition in favour of the parties’ agreed forum unless there are strong countervailing factors.
In the current economic climate, more and more companies are getting into financial difficulties, informal workouts by debtor companies, with support from certain creditors, seem to be increasingly common.
Whilst commonplace in the U.S., uptier transactions in which a borrower teams up with a subset of creditors to issue new “super priority” debt by amending or exchanging existing debt documents, have not been widely used in Europe.
However, with increasing macro economic pressures and financial market instability, we may see more European borrowers taking advantage of flexibility in cov-lite debt documentation to implement liability management transactions as an alternative to, or even as part of, more formal restructurings.
When a company is in the so-called “twilight zone” approaching insolvency, it is well-established that the directors’ fiduciary duties require them to take into account interest of creditors (the so-called “creditor duty”).
Two recent cases, Re Guangdong Overseas Construction Corporation [2023] HKCFI 1340 (the “GOCC Case“) and Re Trinity International Brands Limited [2023] HKCFI 1581 (the “Trinity Case“), reaffirm