In Hunt v Singh, the Court referred to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in BTI v Sequana (see our alert) in deciding when the directors' duty to creditors arose.
Background
Marylebone Warwick Balfour Management Limited (the Company), entered a tax avoidance scheme between 2002 and 2010 which the directors, on professional advice, believed to be valid.
“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”
- From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).
Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.
My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.
“Notwithstanding the court of appeals’ error, this case does not warrant this Court’s review.”
“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”
- From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).
Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.
My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.
“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”
- From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).
Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.
My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.
“Learn something new every day,” is a well-worn adage.
And it’s mostly true (I only question giving a literal meaning to the “every day” part).
Nevertheless, I’m embarrassed to acknowledge learning only recently of the existence of a noteworthy, bankruptcy-related statute: 28 U.S.C. § 959(a). Such statute reads in part (emphasis added):
Excluded from Subchapter V eligibility is a “single asset real estate” debtor.
We have a recent opinion on a Subchapter V debtor who beats that exclusion: In re Evergreen Site Holdings, Inc., [Fn. 1]
What follows is a summary of that opinion.
Eligibility Issue & Standards
The Evergreen issue is this:
In a mass-tort bankruptcy, when 95% of 120,000 creditors vote to accept a mediated plan paying over $7 billion to creditors, shouldn’t the plan be confirmed?
On 5 July 2023 the Court sanctioned Prezzo Investco Ltd's (Prezzo) restructuring plan despite strong opposition by UK tax authority, HMRC.
HMRC has taken a more active approach to opposing restructuring plans and was successful in blocking the plans recently proposed by GAS and Nasmyth (see our alert).
Subchapter V eligibility requires a debtor to be “engaged in” commercial/business activities.
Case Law Consensus
Case law consensus is that such activities must exist on the petition filing date. That means a debtor cannot utilize Subchapter V when:
- business assets are fully-liquidated;
- unpaid debts are the only remnant of the failed business; and
- prospects for resuming such activities are nil.
So . . . here’s the question: Is that the right eligibility standard?
I say, “No.”
A Hypothetical